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Abstract
“M-Bias,” as it is called in the epidemiologic literature, is the bias intro-
duced by conditioning on a pretreatment covariate due to a particular “M-Structure”
between two latent factors, an observed treatment, an outcome, and a “collider.”
This potential source of bias, which can occur even when the treatment and the
outcome are not confounded, has been a source of considerable controversy. We
here present formulae for identifying under which circumstances biases are in-
flated or reduced. In particular, we show that the magnitude of M-Bias in linear
structural equation models tends to be relatively small compared to confounding
bias, suggesting that it is generally not a serious concern in many applied settings.
These theoretical results are consistent with recent empirical findings from simula-
tion studies. We also generalize the M-Bias setting (1) to allow for the correlation
between the latent factors to be nonzero, and (2) to allow for the collider to be
a confounder between the treatment and the outcome. These results demonstrate
that mild deviations from the M-Structure tend to increase confounding bias more
rapidly than M-Bias, suggesting that choosing to condition on any given covariate
is generally the superior choice. As an application, we re-examine a controversial
example between Professors Donald Rubin and Judea Pearl.
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1 Introduction
The hallmark of an observational study is selection bias (Heckman, 1979, Copas
and Li, 1997, Herna´n, Hernandez-Diaz, and Robins, 2004). Many statisticians be-
lieve that “there is no reason to avoid adjustment for a variable describing sub-
jects before treatment” in observational studies (Rosenbaum, 2002, pp 76), because
“typically, the more conditional an assumption, the more generally acceptable it is”
(Rubin, 2009). This advice, recently dubbed the “pretreatment criterion” (Vander-
Weele and Shpitser, 2011), is widely used in empirical studies, as more covariates
generally seem to make the ignorability assumption, i.e., the assumption that con-
ditionally on the observed pretreatment covariates, treatment assignment is inde-
pendent of the potential outcomes (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), more plausible.
And, as the validity of causal inference in observational studies relies strongly on
this (untestable) assumption (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), it seems reasonable to
make all efforts to render it plausible.
However, other researchers (Pearl, 2009b,c, Shrier, 2008, 2009, Sjo¨lander,
2009), mainly from the causal diagram community, do not accept this view because
of the possibility of a so-called M-Structure, illustrated in Figure 1(c). In sharp
contrast to Rubin and Rosenbaum’s advice, Pearl (2009b) and Pearl (2009c) warn
practitioners that spurious bias may arise due to adjusting for a collider M in an
M-Structure, even if it is a pretreatment covariate. This form of bias, typically
called M-bias, a special version of so-called “collider bias,” has since generated
considerable controversy and confusion.
We attempt to resolve some of these debates by an analysis of M-bias under
the causal diagram or directed acyclic graph (DAG) framework. For readers unfa-
miliar with the terminologies from the DAG (or Bayesian Network) literature, more
details can be found in Pearl (1995) or Pearl (2009a). We here use only a small part
of this larger framework. Arguably the most important structure in the DAG, and
certainly the one at root of almost all controversy, is the “V-Structure” illustrated
in Figure 1(b). Here, U and W are marginally independent with a common out-
come M, which shapes a “V” with the vertex M being called a “collider.” From a
data-generation viewpoint, one might imagine Nature generating data in two steps:
She first picks independently two values for U and W from two distributions, and
then she combines them (possibly along with some additional random variable) to
create M. Given this, conditioning on M can cause a spurious correlation between
U and W , which is known as the collider bias (Greenland, 2002), or, in epidemi-
ology, Berkson’s Paradox (Berkson, 1946). Conceptually, this correlation happens
because if one cause of an observed outcome is known to have not occurred, the
other cause becomes more likely. Consider an automatic-timer sprinkler system
where the sprinkler being on is independent of whether it is raining. Here, the
weather gives no information on the sprinkler. However, given wet grass, if one
observes a sunny day, one will likely conclude that the sprinklers have recently run.
Correlation has been induced.
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(a) A simple DAG (b) V-Structure (c) M-Structure
U W but U / W |M T Y but T / Y |M
Figure 1: Three DAGs
Where things get interesting is when this collider is made into a pre-treatment
variable. Consider Figure 1(c), an extension of Figure 1(b). Here U and W are now
also causes of the treatment T and the outcome Y , respectively. Nature, as a last,
third step generates T as a function of U and some randomness, and Y as a func-
tion of W and some randomness. This structure is typically used to represent a
circumstance where a researcher observes T , Y , and M in nature and is attempting
to derive the causal impact of T on Y . U and W are unobserved, or latent. Clearly,
the causal effect of T on Y is zero, which is also equal to the marginal association
between T and Y . If a researcher regressed Y on T , he or she would obtain a zero
in expectation, which is correct for estimating the causal effect. But perhaps there
is a concern that M, a pretreatment covariate, may be a confounder that is masking
a treatment effect. Typically, one would then “adjust” for M to take this possibility
into account, e.g., by including M in a regression or by matching units on similar
values of M. If we do this in this circumstance, however, then we will not find a
zero causal effect, in expectation. This is the so-called “M-Bias,” and this special
structure is called the “M-Structure” in the DAG literature.
Previous qualitative analysis for binary variables shows that collider bias
generally tends to be small (Greenland, 2002), and simulation studies (Liu, Brookhart,
Schneeweiss, Mi, and Setoguchi, 2012) again demonstrate that M-Bias is small in
many realistic settings. While mathematically describing the magnitudes of M-
Bias in general models is intractable, it is possible to derive exact formulae of the
biases as functions of the correlation coefficients in linear structural equation mod-
els (LSEMs). The LSEM has a long history in statistics (Wright, 1921, 1934) to
describe dependence among multiple random variables. Sprites (2002) uses linear
models to illustrate M-Bias in observational studies, and Pearl (2013) also utilize
the transparency of such linear models to examine various types of causal phenom-
ena, biases, and paradoxes. We here extend these works and provide exact formulae
for biases, allowing for a more detailed quantitative analysis of M-bias.
While M-Bias does exist when the true underlying data generating process
(DGP) follows the exact M-Structure, it might be rather sensitive to various devi-
ations from the exact M-Structure. Furthermore, some might argue that an exact
M-Structure is unlikely to hold in practice. Gelman (2011), for example, doubts the
exact independence assumption required for the M-Structure in the social sciences
by arguing that there are “(almost) no true zeros” in this discipline. Indeed, since
U and W are often latent characteristics of the same individual, the independence
assumption U W is a rather strong structural assumption. Furthermore, it might be
plausible that the pretreatment covariate M is also a confounder between, i.e., has
some causal impact on both, the treatment and outcome. We extend our work by
accounting for these departures from a pure M-Structure, and find that even slight
departures from the M-Structure can dramatically change the forms of the biases.
This paper theoretically compares the bias from conditioning on an M to
not under several scenarios and finds that M-Bias is indeed small relative to other
concerns unless there is a strong correlation structure for the variables. We further
show that these findings extend to a binary treatment regime as well. This argument
proceeds in several stages. First, in Section 2, we examine a pure M-Structure and
introduce our LSEM framework. We then discuss the cases when the latent vari-
ables U and W may be correlated and M may also be a confounder between the
treatment T and the outcome Y. In Section 3, we generalize the results in Section
2 to a binary treatment. In Section 4, we illustrate the theoretical findings using a
controversial example between Professors Donald Rubin and Judea Pearl (Rubin,
2007, Pearl, 2009c). Section 5 discusses the relevance of our findings by examining
M-Bias in actual practice and by comparing asymptotic to finite sample proper-
ties. We conclude with a brief discussion and present all technical details in the
Appendix.
2 M-Bias and Butterfly-Bias in LSEMs
We begin by examining pure M-Bias in a LSEM. As our primary focus is bias, we
assume data are ample and that anything estimable is estimated with nearly per-
fect precision. In particular, when we say we obtain a result from a regression,
we implicitly mean we obtain that result in expectation; in practice an estimator
will be near the given quantities. We do not compare relative uncertainties of dif-
ferent estimators given the need to estimate more or fewer parameters. There are
likely degrees-of-freedom issues that would implicitly advocate using estimators
with fewer parameters, but in the circumstances considered here these concerns are
likely to be minor as all the models have few parameters.
A causal DAG can be viewed as a hierarchical DGP. In particular, any vari-
able on the graph can be viewed as a function of its parents and some additional
noise, i.e., if R had parents A,B, and C, we would have
R = f (A,B,C,εR) with εR (A,B,C).
Generally noise terms such as εR are considered to be independent from each other,
but they can also be given an unknown correlation structure corresponding to earlier
variables not explicitly included in the diagram. This is typically represented by
drawing the dependent noise terms jointly from some multivariate distribution. This
framework is quite general; we can represent any distribution that can be factored
as a product of conditional distributions corresponding to a DAG (which is one
representation of the Markov Condition, a fundamental assumption for DAGs).
LSEMs are special cases of the above with additional linearity and additivity
constraints. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we also rescale all pri-
mary variables (U,W,M,T,Y ) to have zero mean and unit variance. For example,
consider this data generating process corresponding to Figure 1(a):
M,εT ,εY
ind∼ [0,1],
T = aM+
√
1−a2εT ,
Y = bT + cM+
√
1−b2− c2εY ,
where we use A ∼ [0,1] to denote a random variable with mean zero and variance
one.
In the causal DAG literature, we think about causality as reaching in and
fixing a given node to a set value, but letting Nature take her course otherwise. For
example, if we were able to set T at t, the above data generation process would be
transformed to:
M,εT ,εY
ind∼ [0,1],
T = t,
Y = bt+ cM+
√
1−b2− c2εY .
The previous cause, M, of T has been broken, but the impact of T on Y remains
intact. This changes the distribution of Y but not M. More importantly, this results
in a distribution distinct from that of conditioning on T = t. Consider the case of
positive a,b, and c. If we observe a high T , we can infer a high M (as T and M are
correlated) and a high Y due to both the bT and cM terms in Y ’s equation. However,
if we set T to a high value, M is unchanged. Thus, while we will still have the large
bT term for Y , the cM term will be 0 in expectation. Thus, the expected value for Y
will be less.
This setting as compared to conditioning is represented with the “do” oper-
ator. Given the “do” operator, we define a local causal effect of T on Y at T = t
as:
τt =
∂E{Y | do(T ) = t}
∂ t
.
For linear models, the local causal effect is a constant, and thus we do not need
to specify t. We use “do” here purely to indicate the different distributions. For a
more technical overview, see Pearl (1995) or Pearl (2009a). Our results, with more
formality, can easily be expressed in this more technical notation.
 
 
 

 	
Figure 2: M-Structure with Possibly Correlated Hidden Causes
If we extend the M-Structure in Figure 1(c) by allowing possible correlation
between the two hidden causes U and W , we obtain the DAG in Figure 2. This in
turn gives the following DGP:
εM,εT ,εY
ind∼ [0,1],
(U,W ) ∼ [0,0;1,1,ρ],
M = bU + cW +
√
1−b2− c2εM,
T = aU +
√
1−a2εT ,
Y = dW +
√
1−d2εY ,
where we use (A,B)∼ [0,0;1,1,ρ] to denote a bivariate random vector with means
zero, variances one and correlation coefficient ρ.
Here, the true causal effect of T on Y is zero, namely, τt = 0 for all t. The
unadjusted estimator for the causal effect obtained by regressing Y onto T is the
same as the covariance between T and Y :
Biasunad j = Cov(T,Y ) = Cov(aU,dW ) = adCov(U,W ) = adρ.
The adjusted estimator (see Lemma 2 in Appendix A for a proof) obtained by re-
gressing Y onto (T,M) is
Biasad j =
adρ(1−b2− c2−bcρ)−abcd
1− (ab+acρ)2 .
The results above and some of the results discussed later in this paper can be ob-
tained directly from traditional path analysis (Wright, 1921, 1934). However, we
provide elementary proofs, which can easily be extended to binary treatment, in the
Appendix. If we allowed for a treatment effect, our results would remain essentially
unchanged; the only difference would be due to restrictions on the correlation terms
needed to maintain unit variance for all variables.
The above can also be expressed in the potential outcomes framework (Ney-
man, 1923/1990, Rubin, 1974). In particular, for a given unit let Nature draw
εM,εT ,εY ,U, and V as before. Let T be the “natural treatment” for that unit, i.e.,
what treatment it would receive sans intervention. Then calculate Y (t) for any t
of interest using the “do” operator. These are what we would see if we set T = t.
How Y (t) changes for a particular unit defines that unit’s collection of potential out-
comes. Then E{Y (t)} for some t is the expected potential outcome over the popu-
lation for a particular t. We can examine the derivative of this function as above to
get a local treatment effect. This connection is exact: the findings in this paper are
the same as what one would find using this DGP and the potential outcomes frame-
work. We here examine regression as the estimator. Note that matching would
produce identical results as the amount of data grew (assuming the data generating
process ensures common support, etc.).
Exact M-Bias. The M-Bias originally considered in the literature is the special
case where the correlation coefficient between U and W is ρ = 0. In this case,
the unadjusted estimator is unbiased and the absolute bias of the adjusted esti-
mator is |abcd|/{1− (ab)2}. With moderate correlation coefficients a,b,c,d the
denominator 1− (ab)2 is close to one, and the bias is close to −abcd. Since
abcd is a product of four correlation coefficients, it can be viewed as a “higher
order bias.” For example, if a = b = c = d = 0.2, then 1− (ab)2 = 0.9984 ≈ 1,
and the bias of the adjusted estimator is −abcd/{1− (ab)2} = −0.0016 ≈ 0; if
a = b = c = d = 0.3, then 1− (ab)2 = 0.9919 ≈ 1, and the bias of the adjusted
estimator is−abcd/{1− (ab)2}=−0.0082≈ 0. Even moderate correlation results
in little bias.
In Figure 3, we plot the bias of the adjusted estimator as a function of
the correlation coefficients, and let these coefficients change to see how the bias
changes. In the first subfigure, we assume all the correlation coefficients have the
same magnitude (a = b = c = d), and we plot the absolute bias of the adjusted es-
timator versus a. The constraints on variance and correlation only allow for some
combinations of values for a,b,c and d which limits the domain of the figures. In
this case, for example, |a| ≤ √2/2 due to the requirement that b2 + c2 = 2a2 ≤ 1.
Other figures have limited domains due to similar constraints. In the second sub-
figure of Figure 3, we assume that M is more predictive to the treatment T than
to the outcome Y , with a = b = 2c = 2d. In the third subfigure of Figure 3, we
assume that M is more predictive to the outcome Y , with 2a = 2b = c = d. The
biases are generally very small within wide ranges of the feasible regions of the
correlation coefficients. However, the biases do blow up when the correlation co-
efficients are extremely large. Near the boundary of the feasible regions in Figure
3, the M-Structure is approximately deterministic, which is rare in social sciences.
Pearl (2009b) does not exclude the worst cases, and thus he considers M-Bias as a
severe problem.
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Figure 3: M-Bias with Independent U and W . The three subfigures correspond
to the cases when (U,W ) are equally/more/less predictive to the treatment than to
the outcome. In each subfigure, we show the proportions of the areas where the
adjusted estimator has a bias smaller than 0.01.
In Figure 4(a), we assume a = b and c = d and examine a broader range
of relationships. Here, the grey area satisfies |Biasad j| < min(|a|, |c|)/20. For ex-
ample, when the absolute values of the correlation coefficients are smaller than 0.5
(the square with dashed boundary in Figure 4(a)), the corresponding area is almost
grey, implying small bias.
Due to the four dimensional sensitivity parameters (a,b,c,d), a full explo-
ration and graphical illustration over all possible values of the sensitivity parameters
is formidably hard. In the absence of prior knowledge about the DAG, our sensi-
tivity analysis here is based on some simplifications (e.g., a = b and c = d), which
may reflect some real situations. Using the bias formulae in this paper, we can eas-
ily conduct sensitivity analysis for other parameter combinations, depending on our
practical problem and background knowledge about the DAG.
As a side note, Pearl (2013) noticed a surprising fact: the stronger the cor-
relation between T and M, the larger the absolute bias of the adjusted estimator,
since the absolute bias is monotone increasing in |ab|. From the second and the
third subfigure of Figure 3, we see that when M is more predictive of the treatment,
the biases of the adjusted estimator indeed tends to be larger.
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(a) Pure M-Bias. Within the grey region,
the absolute bias of the adjusted estimator
is less than 1/20 of the minimum of |a|(=
|b|) and |c|(= |d|).
(b) M-Bias with Correlated U and W .
Within the grey region, the adjusted es-
timator is superior.
Figure 4: M-Bias under Different Scenarios
Correlated Latent Variables. When the latent variables U and W are correlated
with ρ 6= 0, both the unadjusted and adjusted estimators may be biased. The ques-
tion then becomes: which is worse? The ratio of the absolute biases is∣∣∣∣ Biasad jBiasunad j
∣∣∣∣= ∣∣∣ρ(1−b2− c2−bcρ)−bcρ{1− (ab+acρ)2} ∣∣∣,
which does not depend on d (the relationship between W and Y ). For example, if
the correlation coefficients a,b,c,ρ all equal 0.2, the ratio above is 0.714; in this
case the adjusted estimator is superior to the unadjusted one by a factor of 1.4.
Figure 4(b) compares this ratio to 1 for all combinations of ρ and a(= b = c).
Generally, the adjusted estimator has smaller bias except when a,b, and c are quite
large.
In Figure 5, we again assume a = b = c = d and investigate the absolute
biases as functions of a for fixed ρ at 0.1,0.2, and 0.4. When the correlation coeffi-
cients a(= b = c = d) are not dramatically larger than ρ , the adjusted estimator has
smaller bias than the unadjusted one.
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Figure 5: M-Bias with correlated U and W when ρ 6= 0 with a= b= c= d. In each
subfigure, we show the proportion of the areas where the adjusted estimator has a
smaller bias than the unadjusted estimator.
The Disjunctive Cause Criterion. In order to remove biases in observational
studies, VanderWeele and Shpitser (2011) propose a new “disjunctive cause crite-
rion” for selecting confounders, which requires controlling for all the covariates
that are either causes of the treatment, causes of the outcome, or causes of both.
According to the “disjunctive cause criterion,” when ρ 6= 0, we should control for
(U,W ) if possible. Unfortunately, neither of (U,W ) is observable. However, con-
trolling the “proxy variable” M for (U,W ) may reduce bias when ρ is relatively
large. In the special case with b = 0, the ratio of the absolute biases is∣∣∣∣ Biasad jBiasunad j
∣∣∣∣= 1− c21− (acρ)2 ≤ 1;
in another special case with c = 0, the ratio of the absolute biases is∣∣∣∣ Biasad jBiasunad j
∣∣∣∣= 1−b21− (ab)2 ≤ 1. (1)
Therefore, if either U or W is not causative to M, the adjusted estimator is always
better than the unadjusted one.
Butterfly-Bias: M-Bias with Confounding Bias. Models, especially in the so-
cial sciences, are approximations. They rarely hold exactly. In particular, for any
covariate M of interest, there is likely to be some concern that M is indeed a con-
founder, even if it is also a possible source of M-Bias. If we let M both be a con-
founder as well as the middle of an M-Structure we obtain a “Butterfly-Structure”
(Pearl, 2013) as shown in Figure 6. In this circumstance, conditioning will help
with confounding bias, but hurt with M-Bias. Ignoring M will not resolve any con-
founding, but will avoid M-Bias. The question then becomes that of determining
which is the lesser of the two evils.
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Figure 6: Butterfly-Structure
We can examine this trade-off for a LSEM corresponding to Figure 6. The
DGP is given by the following equations:
U,W,εM,εT ,εY
ind∼ [0,1],
M = bU + cW +
√
1−b2− c2εM,
T = aU + eM+
√
1−a2− e2εT ,
Y = dW + f M+
√
1−d2− f 2εY .
Again, the true causal effect of T on Y is zero. The unadjusted estimator
obtained by regressing Y onto T is the covariance between T and Y :
Biasunad j = Cov(T,Y ) = ab f + cde+ e f .
It is not, in general, zero, implying bias. The adjusted estimator (see Lemma 3 in
Appendix for a proof) obtained by regressing Y onto (T,M) has bias
Biasad j =− abcd1− (ab+ e)2 .
If the values of e and f are relatively high (i.e., M has a strong effect on both
T and Y ), the confounding bias is large and the unadjusted estimator will be severely
biased. For example, if a,b,c,d,e, and f all equal 0.2, the bias of the unadjusted
estimator is 0.056, but the bias of the adjusted estimator is only −0.0017, an order
of magnitude smaller. Generally, the largest term for the unadjusted bias is the
second-order term of e f , while the adjusted bias only has, ignoring the denominator,
a fourth-order term of abcd. This suggests adjustment is generally preferable and
that M-bias is in some respect a “higher order bias.”
Detailed comparison of the ratio of the biases is difficult, since we can vary
six parameters (a,b,c,d,e, f ). In Figure 7(a), we assume all the correlation coef-
ficients have the same magnitude, and plot bias for both estimators as a function
of the correlation coefficient within the feasible region, defined by the restrictions
−√2/2 < a < (−1+√5)/2, due to the restrictions
b2+ c2 < 1, a2+ e2 < 1, d2+ f 2 < 1, and |a2+ e|< 1. (2)
Within 74.9% of the feasible region, the adjusted estimator has smaller bias than the
unadjusted one. The unadjusted estimator only has smaller bias than the adjusted
estimator when the correlation coefficients are extremely large. In Figure 7(b), we
assume a = b = c = d and e = f , and compare |Biasad j| and |Biasunad j| within the
feasible region of (a,e) defined by (2). We can see that the adjusted estimator is su-
perior to the unadjusted one for 71% (colored in grey in Figure 7(b)) of the feasible
region. In the area satisfying |e|> |a| in Figure 7(b), where the connection between
M to T and Y is stronger than the other connections, the area is almost entirely grey
suggesting that the adjusted estimator is preferable. This is sensible because here
the confounding bias has larger magnitude than the M-Bias. In the area satisfying
|a|< |e|, where M-bias is stronger than confounding bias, the unadjusted estimator
is superior for some values, but still tends to be inferior when the correlations are
roughly the same size.
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(a) Absolute biases of both estimators
with a = b = c = d = e = f .
(b) Comparison of the absolute biases
with a = b = c = d and e = f . Within
71.2% (in grey) of the feasible region, the
adjusted estimator has smaller bias than
the unadjusted one.
Figure 7: Butterfly-Bias
3 Extensions to a Binary Treatment
One might worry that the conclusions in the previous section are not applicable for
a binary treatment. It turns out, however, that they are. In this section, we extend
the results in Section 2 to binary treatments by representing the treatment through
a latent Gaussian variable as shown in Figure 8.
Correlated Latent Variables. We extend Figure 2 to Figure 8(a). Here, T ∗ is the
old T . The generating equations for T and T ∗ become
T = I(T ∗ ≥ α), and T ∗ = aU +
√
1−a2εT .
Other variables and noise terms remain the same. Although it might be relaxed,
we make reference to the Normally assumption of the error terms for mathematical
simplicity. The intercept α determines the proportion of the individuals receiving
the treatment: Φ(−α) = P(T = 1), where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution func-
tion of a standard Normal distribution. When α = 0, the number of individuals
T Y
U W
Ma
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d
ρ
T*  
 
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 	
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(a) Correlated Hidden Causes (b) Butterfly-Structure
Figure 8: DAGs for Binary Treatment
exposed to the treatment and control are balanced; when α < 0, more individuals
are exposed to the treatment; when α > 0, the reverse.
The true causal effect of T on Y is again zero. Let φ(·) =Φ′(·) and η(α)≡
φ(α)/{Φ(α)Φ(−α)}. Then Lemma 6 in Appendix shows that the unadjusted es-
timator has bias
Biasunad j = adρη(α),
and the adjusted estimator has bias
Biasad j =
adη(α){ρ(1−b2− c2−bcρ)−bc}
ρ{1− (ab+acρ)2φ(α)η(α)} .
When ρ = 0, the unadjusted estimator is unbiased, but the adjusted estimator
has bias
− abcdη(α)
1− (ab)2φ(α)η(α) .
When ρ 6= 0, the ratio of the absolute biases is∣∣∣∣ Biasad jBiasunad j
∣∣∣∣= ∣∣∣ ρ(1−b2− c2−bcρ)−bcρ{1− (ab+acρ)2φ(α)η(α)}∣∣∣.
The patterns for a binary treatment do not differ much from a continuous
treatment. As before, if the correlation coefficient is moderately small, the M-Bias
also tends to be small. As shown in Figure 9 (analogous to Figure 5), when |ρ|
is comparable to |a|(= |b| = |c| = |d|), the adjusted estimator is less biased than
the unadjusted estimator. Only when |a| is much larger than |ρ| is the unadjusted
estimator superior.
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Figure 9: M-Bias with correlated (U,W ) and binary treatment. Compare to Figure 5
Butterfly-Bias with a Binary Treatment. We can extend the LSEM Butterfly-
Bias setup to binary treatment just as we extended the M-Bias setup. Compare
Figure 8(b) to Figure 6. T becomes T ∗ and T is built from T ∗ as above. The
structural equations for T and T ∗ for butterfly bias in the binary case are then
T = I(T ∗ ≥ α), and T ∗ = aU + eM+
√
1−a2− e2εT .
The other equations and variables are the same as before.
Although the true causal effect of T on Y is zero, Lemma 7 in Appendix
shows that the unadjusted estimator has bias
Biasunad j = (cde+ab f + e f )η(α), (3)
and the adjusted estimator has bias
Biasad j =− abcdη(α)1− (ab+ e)2φ(α)η(α) . (4)
Therefore, the ratio of the absolute biases is∣∣∣∣ Biasad jBiasunad j
∣∣∣∣= ∣∣∣ abcdη(α)(cde+ab f + e f ){1− (ab+ e)2φ(α)η(α)}∣∣∣.
Complete investigation of the ratio of the biases is intractable with seven
varying parameters (a,b,c,d,e, f ,α). However, in the very common case with
α = 0, which gives equal-sized treatment and control groups, we again find trends
similar to the continuous treatment case. See Figure 10. As before, only in the cases
with very small e(= f ) but large a(= b= c= d), does the unadjusted estimator tend
to be superior. Within a reasonable region of α , these patterns are quite similar.
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Figure 10: Butterfly-Bias with a Binary Treatment
4 Illustration: The Rubin–Pearl Controversy
Pearl (2009c) cites Rubin (2007)’s example about the causal effect of smoking
habits (T ) on lung cancer (Y ), and argues that conditioning on the pretreatment
covariate “seat-belt usage” (M) would introduce spurious associations, since M
could be reasonably thought of as an indicator of a person’s attitudes toward so-
cietal norms (U) as well as safety and health related measures (W ). Assuming all
the analysis is already conditioned on other observed covariates, we focus our dis-
cussion on the five variables (U,W,M,T,Y ), of which the dependence structure is
illustrated by Figure 11. Since the patterns with a continuous treatment and a binary
treatment are similar, we focus our discussion on LSEMs.
As Pearl (2009c) points out,
If we have good reasons to believe that these two types of attitudes are
marginally independent, we have a pure M-structure on our hand.
In the case with ρ = 0, conditioning on M will lead to spurious correlation between
T and Y under the null, and will bias the estimation of the causal effect of T on Y .
However, Pearl (2009c) also recognizes that the independence assumption seems
very strong in this example, since U and W are both background variables about the
habit and personality of a person. Pearl (2009c) further argues:
But even if marginal independence does not hold precisely, condition-
ing on “seat-belt usage” is likely to introduce spurious associations,
hence bias, and should be approached with caution.
Although we believe most things should be approached with caution, our
work, above, suggests that even mild perturbations of an M-Structure can switch
which of the two approaches, conditioning or not conditioning, is likely to remove
more bias. In particular, Pearl (2009c) is correct in that the adjusted estimator
indeed tends to introduce more bias than the unadjusted one when an exact M-
Structure holds and thus the general advice “to condition on all observed covariates”
may not be sensible in this context. However, in the example of Rubin (2007),
the exact independence between a person’s attitude toward societal norms U and
safety and health related measures W is questionable, since we have good reasons
to believe that other hidden variables such as income and family background will
affect both U and W simultaneously, and thus Pearl’s fears may be unfounded.
To examine this further, we consider two possible deviations from the exact
M-Structure, and investigate the biases of the unadjusted and adjusted estimators
for each.
(a) (Correlated U and W ) Assume the DGP follows the DAG in Figure 11, with an
additional correlation between the attitudes U and W as shown in Figure 2. If
we then assume that all the correlation coefficients have the same positive mag-
nitude, earlier results demonstrate that the adjusted estimator is preferable as it
strictly dominates the unadjusted estimator except for extremely large values of
the correlation coefficients.
Furthermore, in Rubin (2007)’s example, attitudes toward societal norms U are
more likely to affect the “seat-belt usage” variable M than safety and health
T=smoking habits Y=lung cancer
M=seat-belt usage
U=attitudes toward 
societal norms
W=attitudes toward safety 
and health related measures
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Figure 11: Sensitivity Analysis of Pearl (2009c)’s Critique on Rubin (2007)
related measures W , which further strengthens the case for adjustment. If we
were willing to assume that c is zero but ρ is not, equation (1) in Section 2
again shows that the adjusted estimator is superior.
(b) (An arrow from W to T ) Pearl’s example seems a bit confusing on further in-
spection, even if we accept his independence assumption U W . In particu-
lar, one’s “attitudes towards safety and health related measures” likely impact
one’s decisions about smoking. Therefore, we might reasonably expect an ar-
row from W to T . In Figure 11(a), we remove the correlation between U and W ,
but we allow an arrow from W to T , i.e., the generating equation for T becomes
T = aU + gW +
√
1−a2−g2εT . Lemma 8 in Appendix gives the associated
formulae for biases of the adjusted and unadjusted estimators. Figure 11(b)
shows that, assuming a = b = c = d = g (i.e., equal correlations), the adjusted
estimator is uniformly better.
5 Two Further Issues
One controversy about M-Bias is whether M-Structure is rare or not in practice,
and we go through several examples to discuss this issue. In the second part of this
section, we make a distinction between asymptotic and finite sample properties of
M-Bias.
Is M-Structure Rare? Although Pearl (2009c) argues that M-Bias is a structural
property, Rubin (2009) claims that M-bias is a rare phenomenon such as “trying
to balance a multidimensional cone on its point with no external supports in some
visible directions.” As mentioned in the introduction, Gelman (2011) argues that, in
social sciences, “true zeros” are rare and consequently the independence structure
in the exact M-Structure is also rare. Section 4 revisited the controversial example
between Professors Pearl and Rubin, and Figure 11(a) illustrated two possible de-
viations from the exact M-Structure. Both deviations suggested conditioning is a
superior choice. In the following, we review three other examples of M-Bias in the
current literature, and investigate the plausibility of the exact M-Structure.
T=low education Y=diabetes   
M=mother had diabetes
U=family income 
during childhood
W=mother's genetic 
diabetes risk
T=teacher's 
instructional 
reading practice
Y=student's reading 
comprehension 
achievement
M=teacher's 
reading knowledge
U=professional 
development in 
reading
W=teacher's 
general knowledge
T=use of selective 
serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors
Y=lung cancer   
M= coronary 
artery disease
U=depression W=ever smoker
(a) Glymour (2006) (b) Kelcey and Carlisle (2011) (c) Liu et al. (2012)
Figure 12: Three M-Structures with Possible Deviations in Dashed Arrows
As shown in Figure 12(a), Glymour (2006) postulates a possible M-Structure
with exposure “low income,” outcome “diabetes,” and M variable “mother had dia-
betes,” where “family income during childhood” affects both exposure and M, and
“mother’s genetic diabetes risk” affect both outcome and M. However, this M-
Structure is subject to several plausible deviations: “mother’s genetic diabetes risk”
may affect “family income during childhood; “mother had diabetes” may affect
“low education;” and “family income during childhood” may affect “diabetes.”
Kelcey and Carlisle (2011) have (T,Y,M,U,W ) as “teacher’s instructional
reading practice,” “student’s reading comprehension achievement,” “teacher’s read-
ing knowledge,” “professional development in reading,” and “teacher’s general knowl-
edge.” See Figure 12(b). However, this M-Structure is dubious because of the pos-
sible correlation between the latent (U,W ) and the confounding effect of M on the
relationship between T and Y .
Figure 12(c) is a possible M-Structure investigated by Liu et al. (2012),
where (T,Y,M,U,W ) are “use of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI),”
“lung cancer,” “coronary artery disease,” “depression,” and “ever smoker.” Al-
though it is plausible that “coronary artery disease” is not the confounder between
“use of SSRI” and “lung cancer,” it is very likely that “depression” affects both
“ever smoker” and “lung cancer.”
In summary, while all the examples above were quite useful to illustrate M-
Bias in theoretical research, it is unwise to believe that these M-Structures are exact
based on our background knowledge. Therefore, we suggest researchers conduct
sensitivity analysis, such as illustrated earlier, according to their scientific knowl-
edge about the structure of the DAG and the associated parameters.
Asymptotic versus Finite Sample Properties. The discussion in the previous
sections are mainly based on asymptotic theory assuming large samples. As ar-
gued by Pearl (2009b), this approach allows for investigating the existence of bias
in a certain DAG, and asymptotic analysis helps reveal the structural property of a
DAG. A referee pointed out that the asymptotic theory is quite different from the
more practical finite sample theory. In finite sample data analysis, practitioners,
often interested in interval estimation and hypothesis testing, are typically more in-
terested in whether associated confidence intervals cover the true causal parameters
at nominal rates, and whether tests for null hypotheses about the causal effect have
valid size. These questions are related to the asymptotic property of the DAGs, but
also depend on the sample size, the procedure for constructing confidence interval,
and choice of test statistic. Theoretical discussion of the finite sample theory is
unfortunately more difficult. Simulation study, however, is an alternative tool for
these questions. Some studies exist. In particular, Liu et al. (2012) simulate large
cohort studies under an M-Structure corresponding to their science question of in-
terest, and find that the impact of M-Bias was small for most of their 178 scenarios
unless the association between M and the unmeasured confounders is very large.
6 Discussion
For objective causal inference, Rubin and Rosenbaum suggest balancing all the pre-
treatment covariate in observational studies to parallel with the design of random-
ized experiments (Rubin, 2007, 2008, 2009, Rosenbaum, 2002), which is called the
“pretreatment criterion” (VanderWeele and Shpitser, 2011). However, Pearl and
other researchers (Pearl, 2009b,c, Shrier, 2008, 2009, Sjo¨lander, 2009) criticize the
“pretreatment criterion” by pointing out that this criterion may lead to biased in-
ference in presence of a possible M-Structure even if the treatment assignment is
unconfounded. We investigate this controversy in detail for LSEMs, ideally provid-
ing a template for future research about more general DAGs (e.g., nonparametric
and nonlinear models). While we agree that Pearl’s warning is very insightful, our
asymptotic theory shows that, at least for LSEMs, this conclusion is quite sensitive
to various deviations from the exact M-Structure, e.g., to circumstances where la-
tent causes may be correlated or the M variable may also be a confounder between
the treatment and the outcome. We also go through several candidate M-Structures
in the existing literature, and find that exact M-Structure is likely to be rare with
various deviations typically being more plausible. Overall, this coupled with our
asymptotic theory suggests that for linear systems, except in some extreme cases,
adjusting for all the pretreatment covariates is in fact a reasonable choice.
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Appendix: Lemmas and Proofs
Lemma 1 In the linear regression model Y = β0+βT T +βMM+ε with ε (T,M)
and E(ε) = 0, we have
βT =
Cov(Y,T )Var(M)−Cov(Y,M)Cov(M,T )
Var(T )Var(M)−Cov2(M,T ) .
Proof. Solve for (βT ,βM) using the following moment conditions{
Cov(Y,T ) = βT Var(T )+βMCov(M,T ),
Cov(Y,M) = βT Cov(M,T )+βMVar(M).
Lemma 2 Under the model generated by Figure 2, the regression coefficient of T
by regressing Y onto (T,M) is
βT =
adρ(1−b2− c2−bcρ)−abcd
1− (ab+acρ)2 .
Proof. We apply Lemma 1, where all variance terms such as Var(M) are 1, and
the covariance terms are easily calculated. For example, we have Cov(Y,T ) =
Cov(dW,aU) = adρ, and Cov(Y,M) = Cov(dW,bU + cW ) = bdρ+ cd.
Lemma 3 Under the model generate by Figure 7, the regression coefficient of T
from regressing Y onto (T,M) is
βT =− abcd1− (ab+ e)2 .
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, we apply Lemma 1.
Lemma 4 Assume that (X1,X2) follows a bivariate Normal distribution with means
zero, variances one, and correlation coefficient r. Then E(X1 | X2≥ z)−E(X1 | X2 <
z) = rη(z), where η(z) = φ(z)/{Φ(z)Φ(−z)}.
Proof. Since X1 = rX2+
√
1− r2Z with Z ∼ N(0,1) and Z X2, we have
E(X1 | X2 ≥ z) = rE(X2 | X2 ≥ z) = rΦ(−z)
∫ ∞
z
xφ(x)dx =− r
Φ(−z)
∫ ∞
z
dφ(x) = r
φ(z)
Φ(−z) .
Similarly, we haveE(X1 |X2 < z)=E(X1 | −X2 >−z)=−rφ(−z)/Φ(z)=−rφ(z)/Φ(z).
Therefore, E(X1 | X2 ≥ z)−E(X1 | X2 < z) = rφ(z){1/Φ(−z)+1/Φ(z)}= rη(z).
Lemma 5 The covariance between X and B∼ Bernoulli(p) is
Cov(X ,B) = p(1− p){E(X | B = 1)−E(X | B = 0)}.
Proof. It follows from the definition of the covariance.
Lemma 6 Under the model generated by Figure 8(a), the regression coefficient of
T from regressing Y onto (T,M) is
βT =
adη(α){ρ(1−b2− c2−bcρ)−bc}
ρ{1− (ab+acρ)2φ(α)η(α)} .
Proof. We have the following joint Normality of (Y,M,T ∗): YM
T ∗
 ∼ N3

00
0
 ,
 1 bdρ+ cd adρbdρ+ cd 1 ab+acρ
adρ ab+acρ 1
 .
From Lemma 4, we have
E(M | T = 1)−E(M | T = 0) = E(M | T ∗ ≥ α)−E(M | T ∗ < α) = (ab+acρ)η(α),
E(Y | T = 1)−E(Y | T = 0) = E(Y | T ∗ ≥ α)−E(Y | T ∗ < α) = adρη(α).
Therefore, from Lemma 5, the covariances are Cov(M,T ) = Φ(α)Φ(−α)(ab+
acρ)η(α), and Cov(Y,T ) = Φ(α)Φ(−α)adρη(α). According to Lemma 1, the
regression coefficient βT is
βT =
Φ(α)Φ(−α)adρη(α)− (bdρ+ cd)Φ(α)Φ(−α)(ab+acρ)η(α)
Φ(α)Φ(−α)−Φ2(α)Φ2(−α)(ab+acρ)2η2(α)
=
adη(α){ρ(1−b2− c2−bcρ)−bc}
ρ{1− (ab+acρ)2φ(α)η(α)} .
Lemma 7 Under the model generated by Figure 8(b), the regression coefficient of
T from regressing Y onto (T,M) is
βT =− abcdη(α)1− (ab+ e)φ(α) .
Proof. We have the following joint Normality of (Y,M,T ∗): YM
T ∗
 ∼ N3

00
0
 ,
 1 cd+ f cde+ab f + e fcd+ f 1 ab+ e
cde+ab f + e f ab+ e 1
 .
From Lemma 4, we have
E(M | T = 1)−E(M | T = 0) = E(M | T ∗ ≥ α)−E(M | T ∗ < α) = (ab+ e)η(α),
E(Y | T = 1)−E(Y | T = 0) = E(Y | T ∗ ≥ α)−E(Y | T ∗ < α) = (cde+ab f + e f )η(α).
From Lemma 5, we obtain their covariances Cov(M,T )=Φ(α)Φ(−α)(ab+e)η(α),
and Cov(Y,T ) = Φ(α)Φ(−α)(cde+ab f + e f )η(α). According to Lemma 1, the
regression coefficient βT is
βT =
Φ(α)Φ(−α)(cde+ab f + e f )η(α)− (cd+ f )Φ(α)Φ(−α)(ab+ e)η(α)
Φ(α)Φ(−α)−Φ2(α)Φ2(−α)(ab+ e)2η2(α)
= − abcdη(α)
1− (ab+ e)2φ(α)η(α) .
Lemma 8 Under the model generated by Figure 11(a) with an arrow from W to T ,
the unadjusted estimator has bias adρ+dg, and the adjusted estimator has bias
dg− (cd)(ab+ cg)
1− (ab+ cg)2 .
Proof. The unadjusted estimator is Cov(T,Y ) = adρ + dg. Expanding Lemma 1
gives the above as the regression coefficient of T from regressing Y onto (T,M).
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